


83 - 1375

NO. _____



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

GLORIA D. AKIN AND
TED M. AKIN, PETITIONERS

V.

GEORGE L. DAHL, RESPONDENT

APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Petitioners, pro se,

Gloria D. Akin and
Ted M. Akin
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Dallas, Texas 75220
(214) 368-4246
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Of Counsel,

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Richardson, Texas

APPENDIX

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CAUSE NO. C-1869

[IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS]

GLORIA DAHL AKIN	\$	
and TED M. AKIN	\$	
	\$	FROM DALLAS CO.,
vs.	\$	SEVENTH DISTRICT
	\$	
GEORGE L. DAHL	\$	

Petitioners' motion for rehearing filed herein on October 18, 1983, in the above-numbered and entitled cause having been duly considered, it is ordered that said motion for rehearing as supplemented be, and hereby is, overruled. [November 23, 1983.]

(Justice Robertson not sitting.)

* * * * *

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT

GLORIA D. AKIN ET VIR, vs.

GEORGE L. DAHL

No. C-1869

From Dallas County, Seventh District.

Writ of error granted March 23, 1983. (26 Tex. Sup. Ct. Jour. 288) (Opinion of CA, 645 S.W.2d 506).

Judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. (Opinion by Justice Wallace. Concurring opinion by Justice Kilgarlin joined by Justice Spears. Justice Robertson not sitting.)

For Petitioners: McDaniel and Travis, Samuel D. McDaniel, Austin, Texas, Kronzer, Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Ballard and Friend, James Kronzer, Houston, Texas.

For Respondent: Bickel and Case, Tom Case, Dallas, Texas.

* * * * *

This is a malicious prosecution suit. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, awarding damages to the Respondent herein. 645 S.W.2d 506. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

George Dahl is the father of Gloria Dahl Akin and the father-in-law of her husband, Ted Akin. The Akins and their children are also beneficiaries of a trust established by Mr. Dahl's late wife, Lille E. Dahl, and of which George Dahl is Trustee and a beneficiary. By April of 1978, differences had arisen between the Akins and Mr. Dahl

culminating in a letter written by Mr. Dahl to the Akins wherein he announced the termination of all relations between himself and the Akins. When Mr. Dahl wrote this letter in April of 1978, he was unaware that a month earlier, March 28, 1978, Gloria Akin had filed an application for temporary guardianship of her father. Specifically the application stated that:

George Leighton Dahl is not mentally competent to attend his person or to his business affairs; that because of his personal condition and the nature and extent of his business interests it is necessary that a temporary guardian be appointed; ...

The order was granted on April 20, 1978. On April 25, Mrs. Akin filed a separate application to have Mr. Dahl committed to a hospital for treatment. The order of commitment was signed by a probate judge and on April 26, Mr. Dahl was arrested and committed to Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas. Three weeks later, May 16, this mental illness proceeding

was dismissed and no appeal was taken therefrom. On May 22, Mrs. Akin amended her March 28 temporary guardianship application, seeking permanent guardianship. A competency trial was subsequently held with findings favorable to Mr. Dahl, and on May 30, 1978, the Temporary Guardianship Order was revoked. As a consequence of these events, Mr. Dahl filed suit against the Akins, alleging among other things, malicious prosecution. At a trial before a jury, the Akins were found guilty of malicious prosecution and after remittitur, a judgment for Mr. Dahl was affirmed by the court of appeals.

Two issues are considered herein; one concerning a lack of probable cause for initiating the prosecutions and the other touching vicarious liability of a joint tort-feasor.

In order to make out a prima facie case of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show, among other things, that

there was a lack of probable cause for the proceedings brought against him by the defendant. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. 1982). It is the contention of the petitioners that once some evidence of probable cause is presented by the defendant, only rebutting evidence as to those specific facts may be shown, and if those specific facts supporting probable cause are not rebutted the question is no longer one for the trier of fact but a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or instructed verdict was proper because probable cause was established by the Akins as a matter of law and no issue was left for a jury determination.

Initially, it is necessary to separate the various types of evidence presented for review. The Akins rest their point of error on testimony and affidavits which they feel was evidence of probable cause to seek guardianship and hospitalization of Mr. Dahl. On the

other hand, Mr. Dahl presented independent evidence that he did not require a guardian nor hospitalization, plus evidence rebutting that evidence of the Akins which they allege demonstrated the probable cause to take the action they did. Mr. Dahl was found sane and competent at a jury trial in May of 1978. This eventual adjudication of the mental state of Mr. Dahl is an event subsequent to his confinement and guardianship proceedings and has no bearing on the beliefs and motivations of the Akins when they took the actions they did against Mr. Dahl. This is, however, a two-edged sword. Just as his eventual adjudication as sane and his subsequent release was not evidence of a lack of probable cause, the initial determination of a lack of competency made shortly after his confinement was not evidence of probable cause. Events subsequent to the action of confinement and legal proceedings may tend to show whether the action

of the Akins turned out to be correct or incorrect, but is not material to the beliefs and motives at the time the proceedings were instituted. Green v. Meadows, 517 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975) rev'd on other grounds, 524 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1975). It is the events prior to the institution of the proceedings which must be examined, and only those events, to determine if the defendants had probable cause to act.

In this regard, it is also not evidence of probable cause that the probate courts agreed to take the temporary guardianship and commitment action. Raleigh v. Heidenheimer Bros. v. Cook. 60 Tex. 438, 442 (1883). Holding otherwise would only invite chicanery and allow those misleading the lower courts to profit on appeal by their misdeeds. It is the party instigating the lawsuit in question who receives the scrutiny of the court as to the beliefs and

motivations and not the magistrate or tribunal which may have initially been convinced that the prosecution was proper.

The burden of proving that no probable cause existed for instituting the proceedings in a malicious prosecution case is initially upon the plaintiff, and there inferrably is an initial presumption that a defendant acted reasonably and in good faith and therefore had probable cause. See and compare, Sebastian v. Cheney, 36 Tex. 497, 25 S.W. 691, 693-694 (1894). However, this presumption in favor of the defendant disappears when the plaintiff produces evidence that the motives, grounds, beliefs and other evidence upon which the plaintiff acted were indeed not probable cause to commence the proceedings which the plaintiff instituted. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to offer independent proof of probable cause. Once these opposing parties have

entered into a factual contest on the issue of probable cause, a fact issue is created for resolution by the trier of fact. This is a cornerstone of our judicial system.

"When the facts are in controversy the question of probable cause must necessarily go to the jury, and then the court must give such instruction as will enable them to draw the correct conclusion from the facts as they may find them and the law thus given."
(Citations omitted.)

Landa v. Obert, 45 Tex. 539, 543 (1876).

Not only may the trier of fact look to evidence relative to the motivation and beliefs of the party instigating the proceedings, but the trier of fact may also look to the good faith or lack thereof demonstrated by the prosecutor of the action. Lloyd v. Myers, 586 S.W.2d 222, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco, 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Eans v. Grocers Supply Co., 580 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). It is proper for the

trier of fact to consider all evidence which the prosecutor of the action knew or should have known relative to the condition of the plaintiff and upon which evidence the prosecutor based or should have based his action. We therefore hold that the jury properly considered all of the evidence surrounding the motivation, beliefs, and good faith of the prosecutor of this action.

Petitioners present a no-evidence point concerning the lack of probable cause finding. When considering a no-evidence point, we must examine the record to determine if there is at least some evidence of probative force to support the findings of the trier of fact. Ray v. Farmer's State Bank, 576 S.W.2d, 607, 609-10 (Tex. 1979). The evidence is set out in great detail in the court of appeals opinion and we will not repeat it here. However, we have examined the record and find there is evidence to support the jury's findings that the

prosecutor of the action in this case lacked probable cause.

Lastly, we will consider the standard by which the jury is instructed to make its determination as to the existence or non-existence of probable cause itself. Long ago, this Court stated in Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320 (1885) that,

"Among the very best definitions given of probable cause, the absence or want of which is essential in actions for malicious prosecution, is that by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. 545, and which is, 'the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.'"

Id., at 323. Williams v. Frank Parra Chev. Inc., 552 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ). The standard set out is an objective one wherein the charge of the jury is one concerning a reasonable person test to find no

probable cause. This is essentially the charge set out by the trial court and is approved by this Court.

The second issue before this Court concerns the finding by the trier of fact of a conspiracy between the Akins and the award of exemplary damages flowing therefrom absent a specific finding of malice on the part of Ted Akin.

Petitioner's first point of error surrounding this issue is that the evidence is insufficient in law and fact to support the conspiracy finding. This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain a factual insufficiency point. Hall v. Villareal Development, Corp., 522 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. 1975). Regarding legal insufficiency, we have examined the record and found evidence to support the jury findings regarding conspiracy. The Akins next argue in essence that Ted Akin cannot be guilty of malicious prosecution absent a finding of malice against him, and as a consequence the

exemplary damages may not be awarded against him.

Malice is an element of malicious prosecution. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d at 918. The jury found that Gloria Akin acted with malice in prosecuting the guardianship and mental illness proceedings and that Ted Akin and Gloria Akin acted in a conspiracy in planning, instituting and maintaining the guardianship and mental illness actions. An unlawful act alone is not grounds for punitive or exemplary damages; more is required in the nature of an act which is wanton or malicious. Ware v. Paxton, 359 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1962). In the present case, there was no issue presented to the jury inquiring as to malice on the part of Ted Akin. However, once a civil conspiracy is found, each co-conspirator is responsible for the action of any of the co-conspirators which is in furtherance of the unlawful combination. Carroll v. Timmers Chev.,

Inc. 592 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex. 1979).
Therefore, each element of the cause of action of malicious prosecution is imputed to each co-conspirator. If the object of the conspiracy is an unlawful tort, such as negligence, which did not contain wanton behavior, malice, or their progeny as an element of the cause of action, then that additional finding would be necessary as to each co-conspirator against whom exemplary damages were sought. In the present case, however, malice is an essential element of the offense of malicious prosecution and a finding that Ted Akin conspired with Gloria Akin in conduct which amounts to malicious prosecution precludes the necessity of a specific finding of malice on the part of Ted Akin.

JAMES P. WALLACE
Justice

Concurring opinion by Justice
Kilgarlin joined by Justice Spears.
Justice Robertson not sitting.

Opinion delivered: October 5, 1983.

CONCURRING OPINION

The majority has correctly concluded that because of the conspiracy finding against Ted Akin it is not necessary that there be a finding of malice on his part for him to be subject to punitive damages.

I write only because the punitive damage issue submitted inquired how much money George Leighton Dahl should be awarded as exemplary damages. That special issue was erroneous, but as no objection was levelled against it, and no points of error preserved as to its submission, the Akins cannot now be heard to complain.

The punitive damages issue properly should have been divided into two parts, allowing the jury, if it desired, to assess differing amounts of exemplary damages against the Akins.

This matter has been the settled law of this state since this Court's holding in St. Louis and S.W. Ry. Co. of

Texas v. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S.W. 144 (1908). That case involved allegations of conspiracy to falsely and maliciously accuse Thompson, the railroad's employee, of wrongdoing. This Court held that if any of the defendants were actuated by malice in making charges against Thompson, then the jury, in its discretion, could assess exemplary damages against any or all of the defendants. However, this Court went on to state that unlike actual damages, all defendants should not be subjected to the same verdict of exemplary damages, because they may have acted with varying degrees of malice, or with no malice at all.

Although there are a few exceptions, the Texas position represents the view taken in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the United States. For cases involving allegations of conspiracy and/or malicious persecution where it was held that inquiry as to

exemplary damages should be made separately as to each defendant, see Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir., 1980); Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Short, 80 Nev. 505, 396 P.2d 855 (1964); Freeman v. Sproles, 204 Va. 353, 131 S.E.2d 410 (1963); Mahanna v. Westland Oil Co., 107 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1960); Edquest v. Tripp & Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 19 P.2d 637 (1933); Thompson v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 271 P. 198 (1928); and Nelson v. Halvorson, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912).

Accordingly, I would submit that in cases such as this, a proper submission of punitive damages would be not how much the plaintiff should recover in total, but rather how much the plaintiff should recover as against each specific defendant.

WILLIAM W. KILGARLIN
Justice

Justice Spears joins in this concurring opinion.

Opinion delivered October 5, 1983.

* * * * *

George Leighton DAHL, Appellant,

v.

Gloria Dahl AKIN and Ted M. Akin,
Appellees.

Gloria Dahl AKIN, et al., Appellants,

v.

George Leighton DAHL, Appellee.

Nos. 9339 to 9341

Court of Appeals of Texas,
Amarillo.

Oct. 29, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 22, 1982.

REYNOLDS, Chief Justice.

The litigants have perfected three separate appeals from individual judgments rendered in three suits filed in different district courts of Dallas County and consolidated for trial before a jury. The appeals, involving a number of interrelated subject matters, were submitted together, and this opinion

sets forth the rationale upon which we have rendered a judgment in each cause.

Preliminary summaries of the background, factual setting, and litigation are appropriate to position the appeals. The details adscititious to the summaries and pertinent to each cause are included in the discussion of the appeal of that cause.

Background

Gloria Dahl Akin is the only child of George Leighton Dahl and his deceased wife, Lille E. Dahl. Mrs. Akin and her husband, Justice Ted M. Akin, are the parents of four children, two of whom were minors when these causes were tried.

By her will, Mrs. Dahl, who died in 1957, created a testamentary trust--the Lille E. Dahl Trust. Vesting the residue of her estate in Mr. Dahl, who was appointed trustee, and his successors, in trust, Mrs. Dahl specified that

(b) If at any time during the life of my husband, GEORGE L. DAHL, his income from all other sources is insufficient to support and maintain him in the station of life to which he is accustomed, having in mind his income from all other sources, there shall be paid to my husband out of the net income and/or corpus of the Trust such amounts as are necessary to make up such deficiency, it being specifically understood, however, that my husband, GEORGE L. DAHL, shall in no manner participate in any decisions with reference to payments to himself out of the income and/or corpus of the Trust, but such decisions shall be made by my said daughter Gloria Lille Dahl Akin, if living ...

Subject to this provision, Mrs. Dahl then provided that

the remaining net income of the Trust, in the discretion of the Trustee, may be paid to my daughter, GLORIA LILLE DAHL AKIN, and to any of my grandchildren in such amounts as the Trustee shall determine.

Any income not distributed to the beneficiaries is, by the terms of the trust, to be accumulated and become a part of the corpus of the trust.

Mrs. Dahl next granted two special powers of appointment with respect to

the trust properties. Mr. Dahl was empowered to appoint, by his deed or other written instrument during his life or by his last will and testament, the trust properties or part thereof to and among Mrs. Akin, her husband, and her children and descendants, and the spouses of her children and descendants, in such proportion and upon such terms and conditions and upon such trusts as he shall determine. Subject to that special power of appointment, Mrs. Akin was granted the power to appoint the trust properties, by her will at her death, to and among her husband, and her children and descendants, and the spouses of her children and descendants, upon such terms and conditions and subject to such trusts as she may see fit.

Subject to the two special powers of appointment, the trust was to continue until its termination at the death of Mr. Dahl and Mrs. Akin. By the trust's termination at that time, the assets

vest in Mrs. Akins' children, except for twenty percent of the assets which will vest in Justice Akin upon certain contingencies.

Mrs. Dahl declared that the trustee shall have a reasonable compensation, but not to exceed the fees charged by trust departments of banks in Dallas. She provided broad powers in the trustee over the trust properties, specifying that no trustee shall be liable for any mistake or error in judgment, but shall be liable only in case of bad faith or dishonesty.

The First National Bank in Dallas and Mrs. Akin are appointed successor co-trustees to Mr. Dahl. Mrs. Akin may remove the bank as co-trustee, but, in that event, she shall appoint as successor trustee a national bank having trust powers.

Factual Setting

When the trust came into being in 1961, its assets were approximately one-

half million dollars. During Mr. Dahl's tenure as trustee, he distributed to the Akins and their children trust funds amounting to more than \$600,000, excluding distributions made and returned in the form of loans for the trust or to Mr. Dahl. At the time of the trial in 1980, the corpus of the trust was valued in excess of two million dollars.

Beginning in 1966, Mr. Dahl borrowed from Mrs. Akin various sums of money which had been distributed to her by the trust and evidenced by his indebtednesses by notes. In 1969, Mr. Dahl and the Akins executed an instrument "constituting a mutual understanding and agreement" concerning recited money matters, which expresses that "the general principle or method of settlement agreed upon" includes a proviso that

Any balance of personal notes from George L. Dahl to Ted & Gloria Akin ... would continue to be held by Gloria Akin as claims to be collected from the estate of George L. Dahl upon his demise. The personal notes

of George L. Dahl are to be renewed annually, but shall not carry any interest ...

At the time of trial, the personal notes from Mr. Dahl were in the principal amounts of \$274,702.26 to Mrs. Akin, \$38,500 to Mrs. Akin as trustee for George D. Akin, and \$38,500 to Mrs. Akin as trustee for Laurel S. Akin.

In 1970, the Akins guaranteed \$160,000 of Teletronics Industries, Inc.'s \$180,000 note held by First National Bank in Dallas. In 1971, Justice Akin executed a security agreement and delivered a certificate for 12,000 shares of Hargrove Electric Company, Inc. stock to the bank, together with a stock power form executed in blank, in connection with his securing the payment of an indebtedness unrelated to the Teletronics note. The indebtedness was paid, but the stock certificate was not retrieved.

When Teletronics defaulted on its note in 1972, the bank filed suit

against the Akins. The trust then paid \$107,781 to the bank to pay the balance due on the Teletronics note on behalf of the Akins. The bank assigned the Teletronics note and security agreement, together with the Akins' guaranty, to the trust. At the same time, the bank delivered to the trust the security agreement executed by Justice Akin in 1971, the Hargrove stock certificate, and the executed stock power form in blank.

The \$107,781 paid by the trust was not handled as a distribution of trust funds. Later it was written off as an uncollectible account, the trust taking a tax credit.

In 1975, the trust delivered three checks totaling \$318,600 to the Akins, who used the money to pay off another guaranteed Teletronics note and other debts. The delivery was not handled as a distribution of trust funds because there would have been substantial income

tax liability to the Akins. Instead, there was completed a transaction -- a "tax gimmick," in the words of Mr. Dahl's comptroller--whereby the Akins sold and conveyed a number of rental properties they owned, collectively referred to as the McKinney Street property, to the trust for \$318,600, which generated a lesser capital gains tax to the Akins.

Afterwards it was discovered that title to one of the tracts, more accurately described as the Richland Hills property, was in Hargrove Electric Company, Inc. On 28 May 1975, Mr. Dahl, as trustee of the trust, and Justice Akin executed a memorandum agreement, which recited that since Justice Akin, who owned fifty percent of the authorized and issued stock of the Hargrove corporation, had theretofore pledged all of his Hargrove stock to the trust as collateral to secure any and all indebtedness he may owe the trust, the trust

would convey the property to Justice Akin as trustee with authority to convey the property to the Hargrove corporation, and that the relationship between the corporation, Justice Akin, and the trust with respect to the pledged stock would be computed and finalized by 1 July 1975.

Subsequently, the trust sold the McKinney Street property tracts, except for three of the tracts. The comptroller, giving the details of the transactions, testified that the trust "about broke even on the thing".

Litigation

Differences arose between Mr. Dahl and the Akins. Initially, the focus was on the Akins' objection to Mr. Dahl's proposed remarriage and his reaction, together with his criticism of the Akins' spending habits. In a 24 April 1978 letter to the Akins, Mr. Dahl set forth his view of the differences and

announced his severance of all relationships with the Akins.

In the interim on 28 March 1978, Mrs. Akin had filed an application for the immediate appointment of a temporary guardian for the person and estate of Mr. Dahl, who was unaware of the action. The matter was not pressed until April 20, at which time Mrs. Akin was appointed temporary guardian by a court order fixing her bond at one million dollars. She filed the bond and took the oath of office on April 21, but the instruments were not filed until the 26th of April.

Meanwhile on April 25, Mrs. Akin signed and filed an application alleging that Mr. Dahl was mentally ill and required observation and/or treatment in a mental hospital. As a result, Mr. Dahl was arrested on the court's warrant on April 26, and he was confined in a hospital for some two weeks. At a hearing on May 16, the judge dismissed the mental illness proceedings. No appeal was

taken from the May 17 judgment of dismissal.

Thereafter on 22 May 1978, Mrs. Akin amended her guardianship application to allege the need to appoint a permanent guardian of both the person and estate of Mr. Dahl upon the ground that he "is not mentally competent or physically able to attend to his personal affairs or business affairs." Upon a jury verdict that Mr. Dahl "is not of unsound mind," the court rendered judgment denying Mrs. Akin's application for permanent guardianship. On appeal, the judgment was reformed to comport with the jury's verdict and, as reformed, was affirmed. In re Guardianship of Dahl, 590 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The litigation spawned the three lawsuits underlying the appeals now before us. The suits are noted in the order of filing.

First, Mr. Dahl brought an action, No. 78-11230-L on the docket of the 193rd Judicial District Court, against the Akins. By this action, Mr. Dahl sought to hold the Akins liable in damages for, among other torts, malicious prosecution.

Then, Mrs. Akin, individually and as trustee for two of the Akins' children, George D. Akin and Laurel S. Akin, each of whom individually joined in the suit, filed an action, No. 78-12590-H, on the docket of the 160th Judicial District Court, against Mr. Dahl. The object of the suit was for recovery upon three notes executed by Mr. Dahl and to recover stock of the Hargrove Electric Company, Inc. held by him as trustee for the trust.

Next, Mrs. Akin filed an action, No. 79,904-A on the docket of the 14th Judicial District Court, against Mr. Dahl. By this suit, Mrs. Akin sought the removal of Mr. Dahl as trustee of the

trust and to avoid his special power of appointment.

The suits were consolidated for trial. After hearing the evidence recorded in 2,000 pages of the statement of facts and on 56 exhibits, the jury returned its verdict on the special issues submitted for each suit in one charge.

In suit No. 78-11230-L, which the litigants refer to as the malicious prosecution suit, a monetary judgment was rendered on the jury's verdict in favor of Mr. Dahl. The Akins have appealed from the judgment in our Cause No. 9341.

In suit No. 78-12590-H, which the litigants refer to as the note suit, a judgment, rendered on the jury's verdict and the court's findings, was generally in favor of Mrs. Akin and others. Both Mr. Dahl and Mrs. Akin have appealed from the judgment in our Cause No. 9340.

In suit No. 79,904-A, which the litigants refer to as the trust suit, a judgment, rendered on the jury's verdict and

the court's finding, was adverse to Mr. Dahl. He has appealed from the judgment in our Cause No. 9339.

No. 9341--Malicious Prosecution Suit

In his live trial pleadings filed in Cause No. 78-11230-L in the 193rd Judicial District Court, Mr. Dahl sought to hold the Akins monetarily liable individually and as co-conspirators on several causes of action. The causes of action asserted were libel, slander and defamation, false or wrongful arrest, false or wrongful imprisonment, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. He claimed both actual and exemplary damages. Actual damages asserted were: \$4,000,000 for mental and physical pain and suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, damage to his name, reputation, and credit, and loss of ability to pursue his profession; \$2,255 for medical expenses; and \$250,000 for attorney's fees. Exemplary damages of \$7,500,000 were asserted for the willful and

malicious conduct of the Akins. The Akins joined the issues by their general denial.

The evidence adduced about this unfortunate family dispute will be detailed only as necessarily appropriate to and in connection with the appellate issues. At this point, a summary suffices.

To support his pleaded operative facts, Mr. Dahl produced evidence designed to persuade the jury that: he and the Akins had numerous and heated disagreements over his interest in remarriage, particularly his proposed marriage to the lady he later married, and about their spending habits; the possibility of a subject of his bounty other than themselves and their desire to take control of his and the trust's property, rather than their concern over his mental condition, prompted the Akins to initiate, without any notice to him, temporary guardianship and mental

illness proceedings; based upon the Akins untrue allegations of mental incapacity and Mrs. Akin's application founded on legal conclusions, he was arrested and confined incommunicado in a hospital where he was subjected to humiliation and invasions of his body; on the day following his hospitalization, he was served with notice of Mrs. Akin's appointment a month previously as temporary guardian of both his person and his property; the proceedings were initiated by the Akins on half truths and outright fabrications when in fact there was neither need for his hospitalization nor the existence of facts and circumstances suggesting he was mentally incompetent or of unsound mind; the family doctor who relied on what the Akins told him in stating that competency proceedings were appropriate, had not seen Mr. Dahl in more than two years; Mr. Dahl's friends and associates, who were in frequent contact with him, were of the opinion

that he was intelligent and competent; the Akins took charge of his and the trust's properties, removing his private papers and securities which had not been returned, and disturbed his office for an audit which found nothing amiss; and that, as a result, he suffered personally and professionally, and the damage to his reputation as a world renowned architect and astute businessman established during his 86 years was irreparable.

The evidence disclosed that upon a hearing, the mental illness proceeding was dismissed without an appeal therefrom. Upon trial, the temporary guardianship was terminated and Mrs. Akin's application for permanent guardianship was denied upon the jury's verdict that Mr. Dahl is not of unsound mind. 590 S.W.2d at 194.

In turn, the Akins produced evidence designed to persuade the jury that: Mr. Dahl's physical and mental conditions

had changed in detailed particulars and to the extent that they had a sincere concern for his welfare, thinking he was mentally ill and incompetent; although Mr. Dahl's proposed marriage, about which he and Mrs. Akin had extensive disagreements, was what prompted her to initiate the guardianship and mental illness proceedings, her actions were taken because she considered his relationship with his future wife evidence of the changes taking place in her father, and it was time to do something; the family doctor considered the competency proceedings were appropriate; and three psychiatrists, after examining Mr. Dahl upon his hospitalization, concluded that he did suffer from a mental illness, regardless of anything the Akins told them. The evidence disclosed that the hospitalization of Mr. Dahl and the Akins' exercise of control over his and the trust's properties were pursuant to court orders.

Hearing the evidence, which the Akins submit is fairly summarized in our former opinion appearing in 590 S.W.2d at 198, the jury made its findings. The findings, numbered to correspond to the special issue submission, are that: (1) Mrs. Akin did not have probable cause to prosecute the guardianship proceeding, which (2) she did with malice, and (3) the Akins acted in a conspiracy with one another in planning, instituting, and maintaining the guardianship proceeding, (4) Mrs. Akin brought the mental illness proceeding without probable cause, (5) she acted with malice in causing the mental illness application to be filed, and (6) the Akins acted in a conspiracy with one another in planning, instituting, and maintaining the mental illness proceeding.

The jury fixed Mr. Dahl's actual damages at (7) \$1,130,000 resulting from \$1,010,000 resulting from the mental the

guardianship proceeding, 1/ and (9)

1/ Special Issue Number 7 and the jury's answers are as follows:

Find from a preponderance of the evidence that amount of money, if any, that would fairly and reasonably compensate George Leighton Dahl for the injury he received as a proximate result of the guardianship proceeding. In arriving at such amount of money, if any, you will take into consideration the following elements, and none other, to-wit:

(1) Damage, if any to his professional and personal reputation.

\$550,000.00

(2) Compensation, if any, for the emotional distress, including mental pain, suffering and humiliation, resulting from the institution and prosecution of the guardianship proceeding against him.

\$500,000.00

(3) Expenses, if any, including attorney's fees, reasonably and necessarily incurred by George Leighton Dahl in defending himself against the guardianship proceeding and the appeals therefrom.

\$130,000.00

(4) Loss of earning capacity, if any.

\$None

illness proceeding. 2/ The jury's award of exemplary damages on account of the prosecutions was (8) none for the guardianship proceeding, and (10) \$500,000

2/ Special issue number 9 and the jury's answers are as follows:

Find from a preponderance of the evidence that amount of money, if any, that would fairly and reasonably compensate George Leighton Dahl for the injury, if any, he received as a proximate result of the mental illness proceeding. In arriving at such amount of money, if any, you will take into consideration the following elements, and none other, to-wit:

(1) Damage, if any, to his professional and personal reputation.

\$500,00.00

(2) Compensation, if any, for distress, if any, including physical and mental pain, if any, suffering and humiliation, if any, resulting from the institution and prosecution of the mental illness proceeding and his arrest and incarceration from April 26, 1978 until May 12, 1978 in connection therewith, if any.

\$500,000.00

(3) Expenses, if any, including attorney's fees, if any, including attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily incurred by George Leighton Dahl in defending himself in the mental illness proceeding.

\$ 10,000.00

(4) Loss of earning capacity, if any.

\$None

for the mental illness proceeding.

The court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict, decreeing that Mr. Dahl recover from the Akins, jointly and severally, the amount of \$2,640,000 awarded by the jury. Later, upon the court's suggestion of remittitur totalling \$1,450,000 ^{3/} as a condition of not granting a new trial, and Mr. Dahl's remittance of that amount, the court confirmed the judgment balance to be the sum of \$1,190,000.

Appealing from the judgment, the Akins have drafted ten points of error which, albeit manifold, present complaints that have been preserved for appellate review. Mr. Dahl has a cross-

3/ The court suggested a remittitur of \$400,000 of each of the \$500,000 awards of actual damages by the jury's answers to special issues nos. 7(1), 7(2), and 9(1), which are recorded in marginal notes 1 and 2, and a remittitur of \$250,000 of the \$500,000 award of exemplary damages.

point by which he complains that the court erred in ordering the remittitur.

Initially, the Akins challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that Mrs. Akin had acted without probable cause in bringing the guardianship and the mental illness proceedings, contending that probable cause was established by the evidence. ^{4/} The question here, they offer, is whether medical opinion and facts which might have supported a jury verdict that Mr. Dahl

4/ It was Mr. Dahl's burden to persuade the jury to find, as he did, that Mrs. Akin did not have probable cause to prosecute the guardianship proceeding, and that she brought the mental illness proceeding without probable cause. In deciding the contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's findings, we will, as we must, consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the findings and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. In deciding the contention that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's findings, we will, again as we

lacked competency are sufficient to establish probable cause for Mrs. Akin's having brought the proceedings.

However, the controlling question, and the one submitted to the jury, is not so narrow. The court gave the traditional meaning of probable cause

must, consider all of the evidence to determine whether the evidence supporting the findings is so weak or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming that the findings, or either of them, should be set aside. Garza v. Alvair, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). The affirmative findings of want of probable cause are not subject to the Akins' contention that probable cause was established by the evidence. A contention that the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact is proper only where the jury finds the non-existence, or fails to find the existence, of the fact vital to a claim or to a defense. See Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-64 (1960).

albeit tailored to each proceeding, 5/
and the Akins made no objection to the

5/ In connection with special issue number 1, the Court instructed that

[T]he term "probable cause" means the existence of such facts and circumstances that would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within his or her knowledge that at the time in question George Leighton Dahl was a person of unsound mind or a person mentally incompetent to care for himself or to manage his property and financial affairs and required the immediate appointment of a guardian. Further, you are instructed that a person filing a temporary guardianship application may also rely upon information derived from others if such information comes from those who have an opportunity to know, and comes from a credible source, and is accepted by the applicant in good faith, and he or she believes such information to be true, acting as a reasonably prudent person would act under the facts and circumstances. You are further instructed that the verdict returned by the jury in the guardianship case is not to be considered by you for any purpose.

And, in connection with special issue number 4 that

[T]he term "probable cause" means the existence of such facts and circumstances that would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within his or her knowledge that at the time of the

to the instructions. 6/ Thus, the determination to be made is whether the required evidential support exists for the findings made by the jury to the probable cause issues submitted to it.

It does not profit to extract and dissect further details from the evidence. Suffice it to state that, given the evidence of medical opinion and

institution of the mental illness proceeding that George Leighton Dahl's mental health was substantially impaired and because of this he was likely to injure himself or others if not immediately restrained. Further, you are instructed that a person filing a mental illness application may also rely upon information derived from others if such information comes from those who have an opportunity to know, and comes from a credible source, and is accepted by the applicant in good faith, and he or she believes such information to be true, acting as a reasonably prudent person would act under the facts and circumstances. You are further instructed that you are not to consider for any purpose that the mental illness proceeding was dismissed.

6/ It was Mr. Dahl who objected to the instructions, submitting that they permitted consideration of hearsay and excluded consideration of the disposition of the prior proceedings.

testimonial facts bearing on incompetency adduced and referred to by the Akins, the jury was not bound to credit it with more weight than the produced evidence of competency. Compare Coxson v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 544, 179 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1944).

The competency evidence was directed toward showing that at the pertinent times, Mr. Dahl's mental health was not, and there was no reasonable basis in the known facts for a belief that it was, substantially impaired, and that he was mentally competent to manage his person and business affairs. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Burkhalter, 432 S.W.2d 724, 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Of importance for the jury's consideration was the evidence bearing on the question whether Mrs. Akin did or did not in good faith make a full and fair disclosure of all

of the facts and circumstances known to her in bringing the guardianship and mental illness proceedings. See, e.g., Eans v. Grocer Supply Co., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).

[1] Consequently, there being some evidence of want of probable cause, whether facts existed establishing the lack of probable cause was for the jury's determination under appropriate instructions as to what facts constitute probable cause. 1 R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 7 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980). The jury's findings established want of probable cause and, after considering the evidence under the standards of review applicable to each appropriate challenge to the findings, we cannot say the jury's findings are faulty.

[2,3] The want of probable cause find-

ings are not vulnerable to the Akins' further contention that probable cause should be held to exist in this cause because

"the temporary guardianship and mental illness commitment [sic] were brought upon orders issued by the courts of this state after a judge had heard the evidence sufficient to authorize these preliminary actions."

Notwithstanding the court orders, no one has the right or authority, under the law, to start a malicious prosecution; and, when one maliciously sets in motion the machinery of the law in a wrongful prosecution resulting in damage, an action for malicious prosecution will lie. Therefore, in a malicious prosecution action, it is no defense to say that the prosecution was in the course of a judicial proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction. Suhre v. Kott, 193 S.W. 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, no writ). The first

point of error is overruled.

[4] Neither can we, as the Akins urge we should, fault the evidence as being legally or factually insufficient to support the jury's findings that Mrs. Akin acted with malice. It has been a long establish principle that the jury may infer malice from the proof of want of probable cause, even though the jury should not be, and it was not in this cause, so instructed. Biering v. First Nat. Bank, 69 Tex. 599, 7 S.W. 90,92 (1888).

Moreover, although there is no direct record evidence of malice per se, there is record evidence of circumstances bearing on malice. The jury heard the details of the Akins' objections to Mr. Dahl's consideration of remarriage and of his complaints concerning their financial irresponsibility; the evidence touching on whether the representations made by the Akins for the initiation of the guardianship and mental illness pro-

ceedings were full and truthful; the character of the actions taken by the Akins leading to and during the proceedings, and the likely motivations therefor; the nature of the allegations upon which the Akins based the two proceedings and the explanations that the allegations, if true, were attributable to circumstances other than mental incapacity; and the degree to which the initiation of those proceedings curtailed Mr. Dahl's personal liberty and interfered with the exercise of his property rights until the proceedings were terminated favorable to Mr. Dahl. The circumstances, measured by the court's instruction that malice "means ill will or evil motive or such gross indifference or reckless disregard for the rights of others as to amount to wanton and willful action, knowingly and unreasonably done," are sufficient for the jury to infer malice. J.D. Penney v. Gilford,

422 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The second point is overruled.

By the third point, the Akins charge the court with double error in rendering a personal and individual judgment against Justice Akin. First, they contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's findings that the Akins acted in a conspiracy with one another in planning, instituting and maintaining, respectively, the guardianship proceeding and the mental illness proceeding. Second, they contend that without a finding that Justice Akin acted with malice, the conspiracy findings are inadequate to establish a cause of action against him.

In support of the evidential insufficiency contention, the Akins tender this evidence: Justice Akin contacted some people to inquire about their thoughts concerning Mr. Dahl's mental capacity; he was instrumental in recommending and

obtaining a lawyer for Mrs. Akin; and he supported her in her efforts, concurring with her in her observations regarding her father's condition and judgment. It is then argued that this evidence shows only what a normal husband would have done; therefore, they conclude, the evidence falls far short of evincing a conspiracy the court defined to be "a combination of two or more persons who, acting in concert, accomplish an unlawful purpose or accomplish a purpose not itself unlawful but do so by unlawful means."

Yet, the foregoing is not the only evidence of Justice Akins' activities presented for the jury's consideration. The jury heard that he independently decided that Mr. Dahl was incompetent and communicated that decision to Mrs. Akin. He not only recommended and obtained a lawyer for Mrs. Akin, but he met with the lawyer, either alone or with Mrs. Akin, on almost a daily basis

for a period of more than two months extending from before the initiation of the temporary guardianship proceeding until after the mental illness proceeding was dismissed. He made two telephone calls to Mr. Dahl's attorney in relation to a premarital agreement between Mr. Dahl and the lady Mr. Dahl later married. Justice Akin made, or had someone in his office make, daily inquiries to the county clerk's office to ascertain if Mr. Dahl had obtained a marriage license. The items that he and Mrs. Akin took from Mr. Dahl's office and apartment during Mr. Dahl's hospitalization were selected by Justice Akin for the purpose of trial preparation.

Furthermore, Justice Akin, prior to the initiation of the mental illness proceeding, had a meeting with Judge Ashmore, a probate judge. The justice told Judge Ashmore that Mr. Dahl had been doing some strange things, but more than that, Mr. Dahl was supposed to be

taking medication, and if he did not get it, he stood a likely chance of having a heart attack. 7/ Justice Akin added that Mr. Dahl had taken up with some lady (the lady Mr. Dahl subsequently married), who was exercising undue influence on him by encouraging him not to take any medication. Judge Ashmore recalled that Justice Akin said she had gotten Mr. Dahl to quit taking the medication without which, the doctors told the Akins, his life was in danger.

That information, Judge Ashmore said, was the basis for his signing the warrant to arrest and hospitalize Mr. Dahl upon Mrs. Akin's application, the judge stating "that if I didn't get him in the hospital ... the man was going to die if he didn't get medication." In the

7/ In the present action, Mrs. Akin testified that a doctor had prescribed pills for her father, but that she "didn't know what the pills did."

Judge's opinion, no other allegation in the application for hospitalization would be grounds for him to sign a warrant and, if the allegations were not true, there would have been nothing before him.

Judge Ashmore testified that when he later asked about Mr. Dahl, Justice Akin said he was in the hospital taking medication. Thereafter, in a hearing before Judge Ashmore, a doctor testified that Mr. Dahl had received no medication. The testimony that Mr. Dahl was no longer receiving medication or never received medication 8/ was one of the things on which Judge Ashmore based his decision to dismiss the mental illness

8/ Testifying in the present action, Mr. Dahl said a doctor gave him a pill several years ago and recommended that he take that as long as he lived, but "I haven't taken that pill for three or four years and I'm still living."

proceeding. 9/

[5] These evidential excerpts are, if credited by the jury, evidence that together, the Akins had a meeting of their minds on planning, instituting, and maintaining the guardianship and mental illness proceedings. The evidence, together with the evidence sustaining the findings of Mrs. Akin's want of probable cause and her malice, constitute some evidence of probative force to support the jury's findings of conspiracy. The force of the evidence is not blunted by the absence of an open declaration of the conspiracy, for a conspiracy may be, and usually must be, proved circumstantially. Schlumberger Well Sur. Corp. v. Nortex Oil & G.

Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. 1968).

9/ The decision to dismiss was confirmed when Judge Ashmore talked with Mr. Dahl in chambers and the judge found Mr. Dahl to be dapper looking with a sharp memory, particularly as to recall, and in good shape for an eighty year old man.

After considering all of the evidence before the jury, we cannot say that the evidence is so weak or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming that the conspiracy findings, or either of them, should be set aside.

[6,7] Neither are we in accord with the Akins' bare statement under the point that without a finding that Justice Akin acted with malice, the conspiracy findings are inadequate to establish a cause of action against him. The gist of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the damage from the commission of a wrong which injures another, and not the conspiracy itself. Id. at 856; Estate of Stonecipher v. Estate of Butts, 591 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. 1979). Where a plaintiff has a cause of action against one of the conspirators individually, such as Mr. Dahl proved against Mrs. Akin, he may then maintain an action for the conspiracy, Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 16 S.W. 111, 112

(1891), the liability for which is joint. Nortex Oil & Gas Corporation v. Clark, 369 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ). The third point is overruled.

Next, the Akins urge as error that special issues nos. 7(1)(2) and 9(1)(2), reproduced in marginal notes 1 and 2, allow the double recovery of damages for identical elements of damages occurring over a concurrent period of time. Reliance is had upon Huggins v. Carey, 108 Tex. 358, 194 S.W. 133 (1917), and Grissom v. Lopez, 280 S.W. 613 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, writ dismiss'd). The cases are inapposite.

In Huggins, the court's charge erroneously authorized the jury to assess damages twice for the same elements involved in a single cause of action for breach of a marriage contract. 194 S.W. at 134-35. In Grissom, the court's charge erroneously divided the damages for one malicious prosecution into two

causes of action, causing the jury to believe that every phase of the case demanded separate damages. 280 S.W. at 614. Neither of those situations is presented by the record before us.

[8] Although mental and physical incapacity and mental illness may coexist, there is an important distinction between them, In re Guardianship of Berry, 515 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1974, no writ), and, in the cause at bar, different objects were sought to be achieved by allegations of the existence of each. By the guardianship proceeding, the control of Mr. Dahl's person and property, as well as the property of the trust for which he was trustee, was sought; by the mental illness proceeding, the hospitalization of Mr. Dahl was sought. Mr. Dahl sued for damages for the malicious prosecution of each proceeding. The jury made findings, which we have sustained against the attacks made on them, that

established a malicious prosecution of each proceeding.

It is axiomatic that one who is maliciously prosecuted is entitled to damages occasioned by the prosecution. McManus v. Wallis, 52 Tex. 534, 546 (1880). In submitting the questions of damages to the jury, the court was careful to instruct the jury on the compensable elements that could be considered in arriving at damages, if any, attributable to each proceeding. Although the elements of damages for each are similar, the propriety of the elements is not challenged. The jury's verdict manifests a segregation of the damages it found to result from the guardianship proceeding from the damages it found to flow from the mental illness proceeding. Thus, rather than allowing a double recovery, the court's submission only authorized compensation for the elements of the particular injury. An injured party is entitled to that recovery.

Davis v. Teague, 256 S.W. 957, 961 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1923, writ dismiss'd). The fourth point is overruled.

For avoidance of the award of exemplary damages, the Akins cite the principle that where the authorities, after an honest and full disclosure, initiate a prosecution, no action of malicious prosecution will lie against the discloser. Sebastian v. Cheney, 86 Tex. 497, 25 S.W. 691, 692 (1894). We, of course, accept the principle, but not, contrary to the Akins' fifth contention, its application to the mental illness proceeding part of this cause to avoid the award of exemplary damages made in answer to special issue no. 20.

[9] The jury made findings, which we have upheld, that implicitly negate an honest and full disclosure of the facts and circumstances known when the guardianship and mental illness proceedings were brought. The jury's findings establish that the mental illness

proceeding was a malicious prosecution. It long has been the rule in Texas that a suit for malicious prosecution admits the recovery of exemplary damages in the nature of a penalty. McManus v. Wallis, supra, at 547. Accord, Jameson v. Zuehlke, 218 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The fifth point is overruled.

[10] It was evidenced that Mrs. Akin filed the guardianship proceeding on 28 March 1978 and filed her bond and took the oath of office on the 26th of April. An unsuccessful objection was made to special issue no. 1 on the ground that it does not designate April 26 as the date for determination of the probable cause issue. The Akins now contend, by

their points six 10/ and seven, but without citation of supporting authority, that the submission was erroneous. They argue that there is no cause of action for malicious prosecution arising from the mere filing of a guardianship proceeding; instead, they state, that for there to be a cause of action, there must be some action by which the ward is deprived of property or liberty which, in this instance, was on 26 April 1978, when Mrs. Akin qualified as guardian. We disagree.

Presumably, the argument is referenced to the principle that in Texas, damages for prosecution of civil suits with malice and without probable cause

10/ Coupled with the sixth point are complaints directed to special issue no. 2 and to the instruction accompanying special issue no. 1. However, inasmuch as these complaints were not voiced to the trial court during the Akins' objections to the charge, they are waived. Tex. R. Civ. Pro 274; Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. 1978).

cannot be recovered unless the person sued suffers some interference, by reason of the suit, with his person or property. Pye v. Cardwell, 110 Tex.

572, 222, S.W. 153 (1920); Louis v. Blalock, 543 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

But the principle is not associated with the inquiry posed by special issue no.

1. Rather, the inquiry was whether Mrs. Akin "did not have probable cause to prosecute the guardianship proceeding?"

The issues, and its accompanying instruction as quoted in marginal note 5, both comport with accepted authority that the accountability for malicious prosecution commences when the prosecution is instigated. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v.

James, 73 Tex. 12, 10 S.W. 744, 748 (1889), or the suit is instituted, Suhre

v. Kott, supra, at 418, which generally is when the charging instrument is filed, Shannon v. Jones, 76 Tex. 141, 13 S.W. 477, 479 (1890), purposely setting

in operation the machinery of law. Daughtry v. Blanket State Bank, 41 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931, no writ). The points are overruled.

[11] Attempting an analogy between Mr. Dahl's suit and one for malicious prosecution in a criminal matter, 11/ the Akins propose they were entitled to judgment because Mr. Dahl was obligated to prove he was of sound mind and had no mental illness, neither of which he proved. We do not subscribe to the proposition.

Respectable authority has stated that the elements required to establish an action for malicious prosecution are that a suit was instituted with malice,

11/ A suit for malicious prosecution in a criminal matter requires, according to the Akins' citation of Parker v. Dallas Hunting and Fishing Club, 463 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, no writ), and other cases, these elements: "(1) the commencement of a criminal prosecution against plaintiff; (2) which has been caused by the defendant or through defen-

that it was brought without probable cause, and the suit was terminated in favor of the plaintiff. ^{12/} Suhre v. Kott, supra, at 418, and authorities there cited. Of course, the statement presupposes that the malicious prosecution caused damages, Id., for the action falls unless the injured party pleads and proves damages resulting from some interference, by reason of the suit, with his person or property. Pye

dant's aid or cooperation; (3) which terminated in favor of the plaintiff by acquittal; (4) that plaintiff was innocent or not guilty of the charge against him; (5) that there was no probable cause for such proceeding; (6) that it was done with malice; and (7) which resulted in damages to plaintiff." Id. at 499.

12/ These same basic elements, as contrasted with the elements listed in marginal note 11, have been stated as also applicable for a malicious prosecution action arising from an unsuccessful criminal prosecution. J.D. Penney Company v. Gilford, 422 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

v. Cardwell, supra. 13/

As is evident from Suhre, the requisite elements are not enlarged to require proof of sanity and negation of mental illness by the fact that the basis of the malicious prosecution was a proceeding to establish mental incapacity. It is understandable when it is remembered that the law presumes an adult person to be of sound mind and capable of managing his own affairs, Lindly v. Lindly, 102 Tex. 135, 113 S.W. 750, 753 (1908), a presumption that obtains until and unless a party alleging the mental incapacity of the adult proves the allegation. Hall v. Hall,

13/ The requisite elements recently were enumerated differently by the Supreme Court in these words: "1) the institution or continuation of judicial proceedings; 2) by, or at the instance of the defendant(s); 3) malice in the commencement of the proceedings; 4) lack of probable cause for the proceedings; 5) termination of the proceedings in plaintiff's favor; and 6) damages." James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. 1982).

352 S.W.2d 765, 767, (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ). It follows that Mr. Dahl had no legal obligation to prove the soundness of his mental condition. The eighth point is overruled.

With their final two points, the Akins attack the verdict for damages. They argue briefly and generally, sans citation of authority and without specificity as to any of the elements passed on by the jury, that even with the trial court remittitur, the damages are so excessive that either a new trial or a further substantial remittitur is required. By his cross-point, Mr. Dahl asks that we restore the amount of damages remitted in the trial court.

Preliminarily, we observe that the Akins' two points do not comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 418, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, they could be considered to be waived. Burgess v. Sylvester, 143 Tex. 25, 182 S.W.2d 358, 360 (1944);

Hatch v. Davis, 621 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Still, the question of excessive damages was preserved for appellate review, and the points do direct our attention to the question raised; consequently, we will pass on the merits of the points, O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976), particularly since Mr. Dahl has responded to the points without objecting to their sufficiency. Williford v. Sharpe, 578 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).

[12] However, it is not made to appear that we have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Dahl's cross-point. Mr. Dahl has neither asserted nor have we noticed in the record that he made any complaint in the trial court as to the final judgment rendered, or that he gave notice of appeal therefrom. As a result, Mr. Dahl is in no position to now complain of the action of the trial court in effecting

the remittitur and, therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to entertain his cross-point. Texas Oil & Gas Corporation v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 881 (Tex. 1968); West Texas Utilities Company v. Irvin, 161 Tex. 5, 336 S.W.2d 609, 611 (1960). The cross-point must be overruled.

Before arriving at its verdict for damages, the jury also had heard that Mr. Dahl, then 86 years of age, had achieved, before institution of the guardianship and mental illness proceedings, international stature as an outstanding architect, winning many design awards and professionally handling over a billion dollars of architectural work. He was the architect for private, county, and federal buildings in Dallas. He was the managing architect for all of the buildings for the 1936 Texas Centennial in Dallas, and participated in the design of the Cotton Bowl. Mr. Dahl served as architect for some seventeen of the buildings at the University of

Texas in Austin, and for the recreational center on the East Texas University campus. He designed and built the 30 million dollar LTV Aerospace Center in Grand Prairie, which required innovation, imagination, and change. He is a member of the College of Fellows of the American Institute of Architects, an honor afforded only two percent of the architects in the nation.

Interrelated was testimony of Mr. Dahl's success as a businessman. Illustratively, he quadrupled the size of the trust to its present market value of at least two million dollars after distributions of almost one million dollars.

Mr. Dahl testified to the experience he underwent while hospitalized, saying that he suffered mental anguish, pain and tremendous sorrow and sadness from being incarcerated and charged with incompetence and in need of a guardian. He had great doubts about his employability after "going through all of the

terrible publicity" of the incompetency charges, but he did concede he was employable as an architect in a consulting capacity, thinking he can qualify and do his work satisfactorily. But for the charges and institution of litigation by the Akins, he said he could be earning about \$100,000 a year as an architect. He added that he had paid, as a result of the proceedings, over \$200,000 in expenses.

Other witnesses gave testimony that the litigation instituted against Mr. Dahl had a damaging monetary effect and was damaging to the reputation of an architect. The institution of the proceedings was, according to an engineer witness, known in the community and was harmful, as well as, in the opinion of a banker witness, possibly injurious to Mr. Dahl's ability to obtain credit. An architect witness characterized the effect of the proceedings as detrimental,

staggering, and irreparable, which could not be measured in money.

Having heard all of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of \$1,130,000 actual damages for malicious prosecution of the guardianship proceeding, allocating \$500,000 as damages to Mr. Dahl's professional and personal reputation, \$500,000 as compensation for his emotional distress, and \$130,000 for his reasonable and necessary expenses, including attorney's fees. The jury declined to award any compensation for the element of loss of earning capacity or as exemplary damages.

Having heard the same evidence, the court suggested, and Mr. Dahl acquiesced to, a remittitur of \$400,000 of each \$500,000 the jury allocated for, respectively, reputation damages and emotional distress compensation. Resultantly, the verdict of damages arising from the guardianship proceeding became the following: \$100,000 as reputation damages,

\$100,000 as emotional distress compensation, and \$130,000 for expenses.

Also on the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of actual damages of \$1,010,000 for malicious prosecution of the mental illness proceeding, allocating \$500,000 as damages to Mr. Dahl's professional and personal reputation, \$500,000 as compensation for physical and emotional distress, and \$10,000 for his reasonable and necessary expenses, including attorney's fees. The jury also declined to award any compensation for loss of earning capacity, but did award \$500,000 as exemplary damages.

On the same evidence, the court suggested, and Mr. Dahl acquiesced to, a remittitur of \$400,000 of the \$500,000 the jury allocated for reputation damages, and \$250,000 of the \$500,000 the jury awarded as exemplary damages. Resultantly, the verdict of damages arising from the mental illness proceeding became the following: \$100,000 as

reputation damages, \$500,000 as physical and emotional distress compensation, \$10,000 for expenses, and \$250,000 as exemplary damages.

[13] Early, it was established that the reasonable expenses necessarily incurred in defending a malicious prosecution may be recovered as actual damages. Curlee v. Rose, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 65 S.W. 197, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-1901, no writ). Those expenses, which include attorney's fees, still are recoverable. Eans v. Grocer Supply Co., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). There is record evidence that Mr. Dahl's reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and expenses for defending the guardianship and mental illness proceedings were, respectively, \$139,064.27 and \$10,516.43, each of which exceeds the respective amounts found by the jury. There is no direct challenge to the basis for the jury's awards of expenses.

Hence, this portion of the verdict is not vulnerable to the Akins' attack on the monetary awards for excessiveness.

The inquiry, then, is whether the monetary recoveries decreed in the judgment to compensate Mr. Dahl for damage to his professional and personal reputation and for his emotional and physical distress, and for exemplary damages, are excessive under the facts of this cause. In deciding the question, all we can do is exercise sound judicial judgment and discretion in ascertaining what amounts would be reasonable compensation for the injuries sustained. Once the reasonable compensation is determined, any excess above that amount is subject to remittitur. Wilson v. Freeman, 108 Tex. 121, 185 S.W. 993, 994 (1916).

There is no certain measure of damages for the varying degrees of harm caused to reputations or distress inflicted on persons by malicious prosecutions. Hence, in such instances, the

measure of damages generally rests in the composite judgment and conscience of the jury. Norwood Bldg. v. Jackson, 175 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1943, writ ref'd w.o.m.). Because the limits of the jury's discretion are vaguely defined, it often is said that in the absence of circumstances tending to show that the jury's award was the result of an improper motive, or the award is so excessive as to shock the court's sense of justice, the jury's verdict should not be disturbed, Eans v. Grocer Supply Co., Inc., supra, at 23, if there is any probative evidence to sustain the award. Texas Const. Service Co. of Austin v. Allen, 635 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

[14] Nevertheless, a trial court may exercise its sound judicial judgment and discretion to ascertain what amount would be reasonable compensation for the injury sustained, and treat the balance

of the damages found by the jury as excess. Upon determining an amount that would be reasonable compensation, the court should authorize a remittitur of the excess. Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1959). This is what the trial court did.

In determining actual damages resulting from malicious prosecutions, the evidence bearing on injury to reputation and to mental and physical distress, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, are entitled to consideration. Equitable Life Assur. Society v. Lester, 110 S.W. 499, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-1908, no writ). The evidence heretofore summarized not only contains direct testimony of damage to Mr. Dahl's professional and personal reputations, but it supports the reasonable inference that his reputations were grossly injured, by the fact that he was maliciously prosecuted. Green v. Meadows, 527 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]

1975, writ ref'd n.r.). Furthermore, Mr. Dahl's testimony of the circumstances of the malicious prosecutions and their effects on him supports the finding that he suffered mental and physical distress therefrom. The measurement of the distress in monetary terms is a discretionary one. Id.

[15] In determining exemplary damages, the nature of the wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the degree of culpability of the wrongdoers, the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned, and the extent to which such conduct affects a public sense of justice and propriety, are proper matters for consideration. First Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Roach, 493 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). All of these matters were raised by the evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. Again, there is no precise measurement in monetary terms of exemplary

damages and, again, the measurement is a discretionary one, Id., although the amount of exemplary damages should be reasonably proportioned to the actual damages found. Southwestern Investment Company v. Neeley, 452 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1970). Moreover, when a party is entitled to exemplary damages in an action for malicious prosecution, the jury may consider his expenses, including his attorney's fees, in prosecuting the action. Landa v. Obert, 45 Tex. 539, 544 (1876). There was evidence that Mr. Dahl's attorney's fees and expenses at the time of trial were, respectively, \$37,040.50 and \$2,231.19, a total of \$39,271.69.

[16] Throughout our consideration of the question whether the damages decreed are excessive, we have been mindful that it was the jury and the trial court, not us, who saw the witnesses, heard them testify, and were in the best position to judge their credibility and the

weight to be given their testimony. Given the evidence and the jury's composite judgment thereon, the trial court's ascertainment of the reasonable compensation for the injuries sustained the effected remittitur of the excess thereof, the ratio between actual and exemplary damages, and our standard of review, we are unable to say that the damages decreed, or any portion of them, are so excessive as to require a further remittitur. Points nine and ten are overruled.

The judgment rendered in Cause No. 78-11230-L is affirmed.

* * * * *

(1) Opposed submitting issue of probable cause to jury. Reference Petition, p.11(1). Note: Mr. McDaniel was trial counsel for Petitioners.

MR.McDANIEL: All right, and I also want to argue a little bit on the probable cause issue, because I want it very clear in the record that

we are not abandoning that. I did not file --

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. McDANIEL: I know you understand it, but I just want to make sure that the appellate court understands it. The case as we began it has this issue in it, and I did not file a motion for directed verdict on that or a motion before judgment to exclude it from going to the jury, because you indicated that you were going to submit it to the jury and we could argue about that on motion for judgment, which was properly presented, and I think that the record is sufficient on that issue to predicate my point on appeal.

TRANSCRIPT, HEARING ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT, JULY 24, 1980, PP. 32-33.

* * * * *

(2) Argued to the Court the chill on the free access to the courts. Note: Mr. Wright was co-counsel in the trial court for Petitioners. Reference Petition, p. 11(2).

MR. WRIGHT: Would you let me finish? Mrs. Akin testified that she tried to get her father to go to the doctor. The doctor that hadn't seen him, the testimony shows, came down and testified

that based on his knowledge of the medical history of this man and based upon the type of symptoms described by Mrs. Akin, he needed to be confined for medical and mental examination. And he was confined and then these doctors come back in and make examination and have information of physical findings that existed back prior, that would account for these types of conduct; and these types of conduct would be evidence of mental illness. And I submit that we've got a right to show it all. Otherwise, anybody that ever files one of these would be subject to having their bowels laid wide open.

MR. BICKEL: Which they ought to be, Your Honor --

MR. WRIGHT: When they honestly believe --

MR. BICKEL: When they have probable cause.

MR. WRIGHT: You say she's lying about this and we've got the right to show the facts.

RECORD, P. 1393-1394.

* * * * *

(3) Argued that no evidence was introduced nor a finding made that Petitioners made less than honest and full disclosure in commencing the

earlier proceedings, so that the jury findings could not be sustained and probable cause must be found as a matter of law. Reference Petition, p. 11 (3).

MR. McDANIEL: ...Now, its our position that there simply is no evidence of the want of probable cause in the case. There are certain innuendos created, there are certain questions of motive, all of which go to malice, and none of them really go to the want of probable cause. They have sought to prove and perhaps convince the jury that the Akins are not trustworthy witnesses, but the things that the Akins related to the doctors and to the judges were proved up by testimony of disinterested witnesses, who were not impeached. And the question is whether or not that information was sufficient to constitute probable cause.'

TRANSCRIPT, HEARING ON MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT, JULY 24, 1980, P. 34.

* * * * *

MR. McDANIEL: That's correct. Let me say that our motion, as you are aware, raises points of no evidence and insufficient evidence against greater weight and preponderance points on the question of probable cause, in both issue one and issue four, issue four being the mental

illness form. I have argued consistently, I do argue now -- I don't think you want to hear me out in full again, because you have heard me argue it before -- that the probable cause issue first and foremost is an issue of law for the court, and if there are enough undisputed facts in the case to establish facts as would constitute probable cause, then that is not an issue for the jury. Now, you indicated on the hearing that we had on the motion for judgment that the thing that concerned you about that was whether or not she had made a full disclosure, and that is an appropriate area of inquiry, because the cases are clear that if she makes full disclosure she is protected, and if she does not make full disclosure, if she conceals some of the facts, she is not protected. On the evidence, though, I have argued and will argue now that there is absolutely no evidence, as opposed to arguing, there is no evidence showing that she did not make full disclosure to all these people, and that every witness that testified, the judges and the doctors all testified to what she told them. She told them about the marriage, she told them about everything else Mr. Bickel asked her about.

TRANSCRIPT, HEARING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SEPT. 25, 1980, PP. 30-31.

* * * * *

MR. McDANIEL: Here is the issue, apparently, that he's talking about, or here is one of them. "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Gloria Akin made false or misleading statements with reference to the mental competency of George Leighton Dahl to Dr. Harville and Judge Jackson on or prior to the 20th day of April, 1978?" And that was refused. I do not recall what objections, if any, were lodged to that.But I think we could have honestly made the objection, and probably did, that there was no evidence to support the submission of that, and indeed it is our position that there is no evidence to support it, and certainly that those jury answers are against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence on the thing.

TRANSCRIPT, HEARING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SEPT. 25, 1980, PP. 35-36

* * * * *

MR. McDANIEL: He assisted her all right, there is no question about that, but let's look at how you define conspiracy. It's the accomplishment for an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a purpose not itself unlawful, but to do so by unlawful means. Where is there anything unlawful in this matter?

MR. MOUNT: False swearing, for openers.

MR. McDANIEL: Well, he's not accused of false swearing.

MR. BICKEL: He is accused of false swearing.

MR. McDANIEL: Wait a minute, he's not. We're not talking about false swearing. What is there about a guardianship proceeding which is unlawful, and what was done, what does the evidence show was done to accomplish the guardianship that was unlawful? All the evidence shows in this case is that he assisted his wife in hiring a lawyer, and that he supported her, and that he came over with her to talk to the county judge. There is absolutely no evidence that he did anything unlawful, nor is there any evidence whatsoever to show that he did anything whatsoever other than what any husband would have done had his wife been contemplating a proceeding of this nature against one of the members of her family. If we have got conspiracy for an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish an unlawful purpose or end in this case, then any time one of the spouses contemplates a guardianship proceeding or a mental illness proceeding against a member of their family, the other spouse had better move out of the house and get out of the way. There is simply no evidence

whatsoever that he did anything except call up the lawyer. Certainly he talked to him, certainly he talked to the judge. There is nothing whatsoever wrong with any of that. There is nothing wrong in saying that he agrees with his wife and he supported her. That simply is not unlawful, and it does not go to any unlawful purpose either, and therefore --

TRANSCRIPT, HEARING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SEPT. 25, 1980, PP. 50-51

* * * * *

(4) Moved to disregard certain jury findings including the findings of malice and lack of probable cause and argued the trial court erroneously refused to give one of Petitioners' requested instructions. Reference Petition, p. 12 (4).

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
AND TO DISREGARD CERTAIN SPECIAL
ISSUE JURY FINDINGS AND ALTERNATIVELY
FOR REMITTITUR DUE TO EXCESSIVENESS
OF THE JURY'S DAMAGE FINDINGS

I.

COME NOW Defendants, Gloria Akin and Ted Akin and pursuant to Rule 301, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court to disregard the jury's answers to special issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7(1), 7(2), 9(1), 9(2), 10, 23, 24,
and 25 and for cause would show:

1. There is no legally competent evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 1.

2. The undisputed evidence establishes probable cause for the guardianship proceeding on a matter of law.

3. There is no legally competent evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 2.

4. There is no legally competent evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 3.

5. There is no legally competent evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 4.

6. The undisputed evidence establishes probable cause for the mental illness proceeding as a matter of law.

7. There is no legally competent evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 5.

8. There is no legally competent evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue No. 6.

VOL. II, TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, P. 179-180.

* * * * *

AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

COME NOW Defendants, Gloria D. Akin and Ted. M. Akin, in the above entitled and numbered cause which was consolidated heretofore with Cause No. 79-904-A, Gloria D. Akin v. George L. Dahl in the 114th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and Cause No. 78-12590-H, Gloria D. Akin v. George L. Dahl, in the 160th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and said Defendants, Gloria D. Akin and Ted M. Akin, hereby move for new trial in cause No. 78-11230-L and would show:

1. There is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 1.

2. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 1 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong.

3. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 1.

4. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 1 is against the conclusive evidence in this case and should, therefore, be set aside.

5. It was error for the Court to submit Special Issue Number 1 to the jury because same submitted an issue of law to the jury.

6. There is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 2.

7. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 2 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong.

8. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 2.

9. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 2 is against the conclusive evidence in this case and should, therefore, be set aside.

10. There is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 3.

11. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 34 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong.

12. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 3.

13. There is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 4.

14. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 4 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong.

15. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 4.

16. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 4 is against the conclusive evidence in this

case and should, therefore, be set aside.

17. It was error for the Court to submit Special Issue Number 4 to the jury because same submitted an issue of law to the jury.

18. There is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 5.

19. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 5 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong.

20. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 5.

21. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 5 is against the conclusive evidence in this case and should, therefore, be set aside.

22. There is no evidence to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 6.

23. The jury's answer to Special Issue Number 6 is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly wrong.

24. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answer to Special Issue Number 6.

VOL. II, TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, AMENDED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, PP. 189-191.

* * * * *

63. The trial court erred in refusing Defendants' requested instruction number 4 in that under the facts of this case such instruction was necessary to remove from the jury's mind the implication planted and cultivated by the Plaintiff that the procedures used by the Defendants in this case were evil, and the jury was required to be instructed concerning the appropriate procedure under State law in order that the jury could properly evaluate the conduct of Mrs. Akin.

VOL. II, TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, AMENDED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, P. 195.

* * * * *

(1) That the right of access to the courts was involved. Reference Petition, p. 12 (1).

Suits for malicious prosecution are not favored by the law and the reason is that persons should be free to imply the procedures provided by law for protection of their rights and the health and safety of their loved ones without fear of the hazards of a jury verdict. That this is so seems to be the settled and recognized law of this state as reflected in the writ refused case of Lancaster & Love v. Mueller Company, 310 S.W.2d 659 at 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958, error refused) wherein the court says:

[2] Suits for malicious prosecution are not favored by the law. 28

Tex. Jur., p. 446. "The reason for the rule not favoring actions for malicious prosecution, in case of civil proceedings, is that a litigant should be entitled to have his rights determined without the risk of being sued and having to respond in damages for seeking to enforce his rights, as free access to courts of civil justice is provided for the administration of the law of the land * * *." 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution, § 3, p. 955.

There is also another reason that probable cause should be held to exist in this case. Both the temporary guardianship and the mental illness commitment were brought about upon orders issued by the courts of this state after a judge had heard the evidence sufficient to authorize these preliminary actions. Unless the person relating the facts to institute those actions is shown to have been acting in fraud to bring about the actions, the court actions should be a complete shield to liability because the court has of necessity determined that probable cause exists. Lancaster & Love, Inc. v. Mueller Company, 310 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958, error refused); Sebastian v. Chaney, 25 S.W. 691 (Tex. Sup. 1894); Deaton v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 159 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App., error ref. w.o.m.).

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,
AMARILLO, APPELLANT'S (PETITIONER'S
HERE) BRIEF, PP. 12-13.

* * * * *

(2) That without evidence and findings that Petitioners made less than honest and full disclosure in commencing the earlier proceedings, the finding of lack of probable cause could not be sustained and probable cause was established as a matter of law. Reference Petition, p. 12 (2).

There is no evidence in this case that the Akins made false or misleading statements to judges or doctors or that they failed to make full disclosure of facts known to them. Apparently, the Appellee recognized that such was essential to his case because he objected to the court's charge for failure to include an issue inquiring whether Gloria Akin had made false and misleading statements to judges and doctors (S.F., Volume I, p. 1857). The court did not submit such an issue and there is no evidence to support such an issue and the institution of the mental illness proceeding and the guardianship proceeding by duly constituted authority must stand conclusive on the issue of probable cause.

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,
AMARILLO, APPELLANTS' (PETITIONERS'
HERE) BRIEF, P. 13.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Appellee failed to discharge the very heavy burden of proving a negative that Mrs. Akin had no probable cause. Recognizing the difficulty of this, Appellee asserts as proof of no probable cause that, "the reasons given the Courts and doctors were either deliberate falsehoods or else left out such vital facts as to make statements made by them grossly misleading." Appellee's Brief, pp. 16-17. There is no evidence Mrs. Akin lied or intentionally omitted anything, and the evidence is clear and convincing that information from the Akins was not essential to the diagnosis of Mr. Dahl's condition. The tactics of Appellee bring to mind a quotation from Addison:

Our disputants put me in
mind of the scuttlefish,
that when he is unable to
extricate himself,
blackens all the water
about him, till he
becomes invisible.

Joseph Addison, The
Spectator, No. 476, Sept.
5, 1912.

Appellees attempt to black the water about the issue of no probable cause and render such issue invisible by a drumfire of characterization, accusation, and cavil about motive. These things are no evidence that there was no probable cause for Mrs. Akin to act. There was plenty to raise in a reasonable mind the belief that action was justified.

Appellants respectfully pray for reversal of the trial court judgment in the malicious prosecution case in accord with the prayer in Appellants' Brief.

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,
AMARILLO, APPELLANT'S (PETITIONERS'
HERE) REPLY BRIEF, PP. 23-24.

* * * * *

(2) An essential element of Mr. Dahl's cause of action in this case is positive proof that Mrs. Akin had no cause whatever to bring either the guardianship or mental illness proceedings. Proof of lack of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case cannot rest upon suspicion or surmise and requires more satisfactory proof than in ordinary lawsuits. Sullivan vs. O'Brien, 85 S.W.2d 1106, 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1933, writ ref'd). In Griffin vs. Chubb, 7 Tex. 302, 308 (1852) the Texas Supreme Court first recognized that:

"The want of probable cause is a material averment, and though negative in its form and character, it must be proved by Plaintiff by some affirmative evidence. It is independent of malicious motive, and cannot be inferred as a necessary consequence, from any degree of malice which may be shown." (emphasis added)

Thus, apart from motive, surmise or suspicion, Mr. Dahl has produced no evidence to contradict or otherwise

impeach Mrs. Akin's testimony that probable cause existed at the time of the institution of the proceedings.

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, AMARILLO,
APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR
REHEARING, P. 5.

* * * * *

(3) On rehearing, that the Court of Appeals' opinion had a chilling effect on access to the Courts. Reference Petition, p. 13 .

4. The opinion of the Court of Appeals creates a chilling effect on access to the courts, thereby discouraging family members from protecting relatives through judicial intervention.

Of final and compelling concern are relevant considerations of public policy which may well rise to constitutional dimensions in the context of this appeal. If, as the Court suggests, the relatives of an elderly person be subjected to draconian damages for wrongful commitment merely upon proof that the person was competent at a later point in time, then it is respectfully submitted that virtually any family member would be subject to catastrophic liability for attempting to intervene to protect a loved one... The gravamen of this Court's holding is that in such circumstances, if the older person is ultimately found to be competent by a jury of sympathetic peers, the

family members may be subject to millions of dollars in damages. In view of this opinion, we should not later be surprised to see that very few children and very few family members will intervene to attempt to help an obviously ill person who may not know his own mind and cannot protect himself from the forces of modern society. In such a circumstance the purposes of the law and the parens patriae concept will be frustrated if not destroyed.

Finally, the holding of this Court implies the significant infringement upon an individual's access to the courts. Mrs. Akin as well as Mr. Dahl have constitutionally protected rights which include the right to access to the court for a judicial determination of disputed fact issues. The standard of malicious prosecution employed by this Court effectively imposes strict liability upon Mrs. Akin, not for the absence of probable cause in initiating the guardianship and mental illness proceedings, but instead for an error in judgment later determined by a jury of laymen without regard to the overwhelming testimony to the contrary.

IN THE TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS,
APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RE-
HEARING, PP. 9-10.

* * * * *

(1) The resulting chill on the use
of the courts. Reference Petition, page

13³
13 .

The inference of want of probable cause drawn from the actual finding of competence is especially dangerous. The law not only disfavors malicious prosecution actions; it makes available guardianship and civil commitment proceedings to protect persons against themselves. It would be a most dangerous precedent to subject those who institute such proceedings to the sanctions of this disfavored test solely upon a showing that the subject of their - and the state's - concern is ultimately able to fend for himself. Persons who have probable cause to seek civil commitment of a close relative may deem it more prudent not to run the risk of dangers which would flow from the mere denial of their petition. The consequences in perhaps borderline cases may be devastating.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, (PETITIONERS' APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR, P. 11.

* * * * *

As Dean Green has explained, the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action has an "uphill battle" because citizens should be encouraged "to seek the protection of their interests and the interests of the community in the courts without fear of being themselves subjected to the hazards of litigation." Green, Judge and Jury, Ch. 12 (Malicious Prosecution), pp. 338-339 (1930) ("Strict uniform and expert rulings are a premium in these case. Judges play a dominant role in handling them. "Question of law" and "questions of fact"

take on different hues here from that found in most other case.")

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, (PETITIONERS') BRIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 496, P. 26.

* * * * *

Surely the law should not inhibit family members, those most likely to be subject to a charge of improper motive, but also those most likely to be interested in the welfare of other family members.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, P. 6.

* * * * *

Heretofore probable cause has been an objective standard applied to determine whether facts and circumstances known to an individual were sufficient to evoke belief in a reasonable mind. In other words, could a reasonable mind believe? Now probable cause is changed to a subjective standard whereby the question becomes whether under all the known facts and circumstances, or facts and circumstances that should have been known (whatever that may mean in a particular case), the particular individual involved should have believed. The former standard achieved some degree of uniformity and predictability as a test of law, and insured open access to the courthouse. The new standard achieves inconsistency and requires any client to be advised that he acts at peril because a jury may decide such cases on the

basis of what they think right rather than having a legal determination made on whether there is evidence that is sufficient to excite belief in a reasonable mind. The instant case is a good example.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, PP.
4e-4f.

* * * * *

Thus, regardless of the evidence available to the defendant at the time he or she acts, the existence of probable cause is determined not on whether there was evidence sufficient to satisfy the probable cause standard, but solely on the question of whether there was any evidence tending to show a contrary conclusion-competency. The protection of a probable cause standard to guarantee access to the courts is completely destroyed and review of the evidence available to the actor at the time of institution of proceedings from a legal sufficiency standpoint is cut off.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, P.
45.

* * * * *

This Court held that the expert testimony of the three physicians, Dr. Woods, Dr. Grigson and Dr. Howard, may not be considered as evidence of probable cause since those physicians first examined Mr. Dahl after the proceedings were in progress but before they had been

concluded. The effect of the holding is that the only competent evidence as to Mr. Dahl's mental condition which is available to determine the existence of probable cause is not admissible because it was obtained and presented in the only time and manner Texas law would allow. Petitioners sincerely doubt that this Court has seriously intended to make that holding which creates a manifest injustice on anyone seeking to help a family member.

Such a holding is not only unfair but defies logic. Why should the testimony of the statutorily required physicians which corroborates or disputes the belief of the initiator that guardianship is warranted be excluded merely because it is obtained after the proceedings are in progress but before they are completed?

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, P.
15.

* * * * *

This case presents a particularly tragic example of the misuse and abuse of a malicious prosecution suit involving institution of civil proceeding relating to the competency of a beloved family member. Given the nightmare which has befallen the Akin family, it is small wonder that this Court traditionally approved the view that:

"...suits for malicious prosecution are not favored by the law...the

reason for the rule not favoring actions for malicious prosecution, in case of civil proceedings, is that a litigant should be entitled to have his rights determined without the risk of being sued and having to respond in damages for seeking to enforce his rights, as free access to courts of civil justice is provided for the administration of the law of the land..."

Lancaster & Love, Inc. v. Mueller Co., 310 S.W.2d 659, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1958), writ ref'd). The errors of law which have led to the occurrence of this egregious injustice should be corrected before they are allowed to form the erroneous basis for the re-occurrence of similar tragedies in the future.

This is also a case of tremendous importance to the public policy of this State and to the mental health and physical safety of its citizens. Prior to this Court's announcement of its opinion, the law encouraged concerned family members to seek access to the courts for assistance in determining the competency of elderly or handicapped citizens in guardianship or mental illness proceedings. The purpose of the law was to protect the personal and financial estates of citizens whose faculties might have been compromised and thus could no longer effectively care for themselves. If Gloria and Ted Akin are held liable for

relying upon the undisputedly valid medical opinion of four independent physicians that a jury is free to disbelieve, it is submitted that no competent attorney could ever under any circumstances permit or allow a client no matter what their concern for the welfare of another to seek a mental illness or guardianship proceeding under the laws of this State.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, PP.
30-31.

* * * * *

(2) The existence of probable cause as a matter of law and the failure of proof that Petitioners had made falsehoods of any sort in commencing the prior proceedings and thus the failure of the record to support the finding, of lack of probable cause. Reference Petition, p. 13 (2).

In disposing of the sufficiency of the evidence points in the appeal of the guardianship case, the Court of Appeals concluded, 590 S.W.2d at 198:

After considering and weighing all of the evidence and extending due deference to the jury's prerogative, it cannot be held that the jury's finding is so against the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In arriving at this determination, it is recognized that the jury might have, and Mrs. Akin stresses the jury should have, reached the opposite finding from the evidence;...

The question in this appeal is whether that medical opinion, and those facts known to Mrs. Akin, which might have supported a jury verdict that Mr. Dahl lacked competency, are sufficient to establish probable cause for Mrs. Akin having brought the guardianship and mental illness proceedings. Unimpeached evidence is in the record that Mr. Dahl suffered from hardening of the arteries; that there had been organic changes in his brain; that he had begun to demonstrate unusual anger and outbursts of temper which had not previously been typical; that these outbursts were sufficient to alarm his administrative assistant, and his personal physician; that he had exhibited changes in attitude to certain of his employees.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, APPLICATION
FOR WRIT OF ERROR, PP. 6-7.

* * * * *

Lack Of Probable Cause Cannot Be
Inferred From Proof Of Malice.

The case law makes it clear that a lack of probable cause cannot be inferred from evidence of

malice (motivation), see, Parker v. Dallas Hunting & Fishing Club, 463 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), no writ). ("[t]he want of probable cause can never be inferred from proof of malice").

On page 14 of the Court of Appeals' Opinion, immediately preceding the conclusion that some evidence of want of probable cause sufficient to raise a question for the jury's determination of the probable cause issues was presented, the Opinion states the following:

Of importance for the jury's consideration was the evidence bearing on the question whether Mrs. Akin did or did not in good faith make a full and fair disclosure of all facts and circumstances known to her in bringing the guardianship and mental health proceedings. See, e.g., Eans v. Grocer Supply Co., Inc., 580 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).

First of all, there is no evidence of a failure to make a good faith disclosure.* However, evidence bearing on the question whether Mrs. Akin did or did not in good faith make a full and fair disclosure of all of the facts and circumstances known to her in bringing the guardianship or mental illness proceedings, [see] Opinion at p. 14] could be relevant to the issue of malice...

The Court of Appeals said (opinion, p. 20):

The jury made findings, which we have upheld, that implicitly negate an honest and full disclosure of the facts and circumstances known when the guardianship and mental illness proceedings were brought.

The inference is simply not permissible and cannot be considered in gauging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings of a lack of a probable cause.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR, PP. 12-13.

* * * * *

Apparently, the Court of Appeals and this Honorable Court concluded that since the jury apparently did not believe Mrs. Akin, that there is evidence that she lacked probable cause. This Honorable Court in its opinion at page 4 stated:

"Not only may the trier of facts look to evidence relative to the motivation and beliefs of the party instigating the proceedings, but the trier of fact may also look to the good faith or lack thereof demonstrated by the prosecutor of the action." [Emphasis added.]

This analysis of necessity hinges upon whether the jury's disbelief of Mrs. Akin can somehow be converted into affirmative evidence that she lacked probable cause. Petitioners submit that it cannot.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, P.
28.

* * * * *

This argument, which assumes without evidence that the Akins had no idea of the truth or falsity of their allegations, departs entirely from an objective standard of whether the un rebutted facts known to the Akins were sufficient to excite belief of mental illness in a reasonable mind. If fact, the argument gets back to the real problem, must the person who files an action be right in order to escape a malicious prosecution judgment - or must the facts be sufficient only to excite belief in a reasonable mind. What Respondent argues is that if the jury does not believe the Akins, the jury may infer that the Akins did not believe, therefore the Akins are accountable for what the jury infers the Akins did not believe.

Petitioners pray this Court not to permit this inference upon inference approach particularly where it begins with what has heretofore been wholly impermissible inference, that is, that the jury's failure to believe the Akins may be converted into evidence against them, in other words, may be permitted to support an inference that they lied. This is contrary to

Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Grace, 188
S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. 1943) and
Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Burden, 203
S.W.2d 522, 530 (Tex. 1947).

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO MOTION FOR REHEAR-
ING, P. 2.

* * * * *

(3) On rehearing The Texas Supreme
Court's improper use of a negligence
standard to determine lack of probable
cause. Reference Petition, p. .

A. The Appropriate Standard of
Probable Cause in Civil Cases
is Facts Known to Mrs. Akin
Not What She Might Have Known

(1) This Court has stated at
p. 4 that:

"It is proper for the
trier of fact to consider
all evidence which the
prosecutor knew or should
have known relative to
the condition of the
plaintiff and upon which
the prosecutor based or
should have based his
action." (Emphasis add-
ed.)

Petitioners submit that this ap-
plies a negligence standard to
probable cause and is contrary to
the very definition of probable
cause as approved by this Court in
its Opinion, p. 5, as:

"the existence of such
facts and circumstances
as would excite belief in

a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."

Thus, by the long-standing approved definition of probable cause, the test is "facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor," not what the prosecutor "should have known". This Court cites no authority for this extraordinary statement applying negligence to probable cause in the context of a suit for malicious prosecution and, indeed, none exists. This holding is flatly wrong.

IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR REHEARING, P.
24.

* * * * *

Form No. 647-Rev.75

HISTORY OF PRESENT MENTAL ILLNESS

<u>*George Leighton Dahl</u>	<u>*W</u>	<u>*S</u>	<u>*84</u>
<u>NAME OF PATIENT</u>	<u>RACE</u>	<u>SEX</u>	<u>AGE</u>

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN
COMPLETE DETAIL. IF YES, GIVE EXAMPLE.

1. Describe the symptoms that were noticed indicating that there was something wrong with the patient's mind, e.g., lack of sleep

depression, abnormal talk of religion, hearing voices, seeing visions, believing someone or something is persecuting him/her.

*His entire personality has changed. He suffers emotional outbursts without provocation. He is turning against his family and people who have been close to him. He lacks the ability to reason and his poor recall for recent events. He suffers from arteriosclerosis, but refuses to see his doctor of internal medicine for a physical. He fails to regularly take his prescribed medicine. He recently fired his trusted maid of forty-six (46) years and accused her of stealing.

2. Is he/she ever physically violent, or does he/she make physical threats? (If he/she has ever harmed anyone, explain).

*Not to my knowledge.

3. Has he/she ever attempted or threatened suicide? (If he/she has ever harmed themselves, explain).

*No - however by failing to take his medication may result in the same thing.

4. Does he/she neglect his/her personal appearance?

*Yes. He has changed from a dapper dresser to one who wears the same clothes including underclothes for days to weeks at a time. These clothes that he choose are old and dishevelled.

5. Does he/she use alcohol or narcotics, and how much?

*Not to my knowledge.

Dated this the *25th day of *April, 1978*.

<u>*368-4246</u>	<u>*368-4166</u>	<u>*/s/ Gloria Akin</u>
Home ph.no.	Wk.ph.no.	APPLICANT

*Daughter
RELATION TO PATIENT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this the *25 day of *April, 1978*.

*/s/ Galen Samford
Notary Public, Dallas County, Texas

FILED
APR 25 1978
L.E. MURDOCH, CLERK
County Court,
Dallas County, Texas
By */s/ Louise Ellis

Plaintiff's
Exhibit
No. 21

*Indicates information was handwritten.

(a) Any health or peace officer, who has reason to believe and does believe upon the representation of a credible person in writing, or upon the basis of the conduct of a person or the circumstances under which he is found that the person is mentally ill and because of his mental illness is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not immediately restrained, may upon obtaining a warrant from any magistrate, take such person into custody, and immediately transport him to the nearest hospital or other facility deemed suitable by the county health officer, except in no case shall a jail or similar detention facility be deemed suitable unless such jail or detention facility is specifically equipped and staffed to provide psychiatric care and treatment, and make application for his admission, pursuant to the warrant of the magistrate. Such person admitted upon such warrant may be detained in custody for a period not to exceed twenty-four (24) hours, unless a further written order is obtained from the County Court or Probate Court of such county, ordering further detention. Provided, however, that should the person be taken into custody after 12:00 o'clock noon on Friday, or on a Saturday or Sunday, or a legal holiday, then the twenty-four-hour period allowed for obtaining the court order permitting further detention shall begin at 9:00 o'clock a.m. on the first succeeding business day.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

A sworn Application of Temporary Hospitalization of a proposed patient may be filed with the county court of the county in which the proposed patient resides or in which the proposed patient is found or in which the proposed patient is hospitalized by court order. The Application may be made by any adult person, or by the county judge, and shall state upon information and belief that the proposed patient is not charged with a criminal offense, that he is mentally ill, and that for his own welfare and protection or the protection of others he requires observation and/or treatment in a mental hospital. An Order transferring a criminal defendant against whom all charges have been dismissed to the appropriate court for a hearing on temporary commitment pursuant to Section 7 of Article 46.02, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965, shall state that all such charges have been dismissed and the Order shall serve as the Application for Temporary Hospitalization of the proposed patient. Acts 1979, 66th Leg., p. 790, ch. 351, §1, eff. Aug. 27, 1979.

TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN.art.
(VERNON'S 1983 SUPP.)

5547-31

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

A sworn Application of Temporary Hospitalization of a proposed patient may be filed with

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TEXAS STATUTES AND CODES, art. 5547-31
(WEST'S 1977 SUPP.)

* * * * *

A proceeding for the appointment of a guardian shall be begun by written application filed in the court of the county having venue thereof. Any person may make such application. Such application shall state:

(a) The name, sex, date of birth if a minor, and residence, of the person for whom the appointment of a guardian is sought; and

(b) If a minor, the names of the parents and next of kin of such persons, and whether either or both of the parents are deceased; and

(c) A general description of the property comprising such person's estate, if guardianship of the estate is sought; and

(d) The facts which require that a guardian be appointed; and

(e) The name, relationship, and address of the person whom the applicant desires to have appointed as guardian; and

(f) Whether guardianship of the person and estate, or of the person or of the estate, is sought; and

(g) Such other facts as show that the court has venue over the proceeding.

Acts 1955, 54th Leg., p. 88, ch. 55, eff. Jan. 1, 1956.

TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §111 (VERNON'S 1980)